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By DR. EMIL PAIN
"We know that Putin prefers the Korean model of political and economic development, 
but it is not known which Korea he means, the North or the South." This joke became 
popular in Russia because it reflects the ambiguities of Putin's policies. A specific 
nationalities policy has not been articulated, making it difficult to say precisely what 
nationalities line he is pursuing or would like to pursue. Moreover, the overall aims and 
strategic meaning of his policies have not been fully revealed. Similarly, there has been 
no attempt to tackle the problem of nationalities living outside their territorial formations. 
For instance, there is no law on ethnic minorities. At the same time Russia's most 
pressing problem has been maintaining the federation and responding to the challenges 
posed by movements seeking increased powers for territorial entities.
The best we can do is evaluate the impact of specific policies of the new administration 
-- the administrative reorganization, the second Chechen war, support for certain 
persons in the last round of gubernatorial elections -- on nationality processes in 
Russia.
The policy of the Federation Council -- in particular the removal of regional leaders and 
the creation of seven administrative areas with a governor-general at the helm -- is seen 
in the regions as a pressure tactic, so it is disliked by all the regional leaders. But most 
of the leaders of the republics do not exhibit their negative sentiments against Putin's 
policies openly. Instead, they secretly have allowed nationalistic movements to develop 
in their republics. The only example of open negative reaction to the Kremlin policies, 
until recently, was from the president of the Chuvash republic, Nikolay Federov, when 
the administrative changes were announced last May. The leaders of Dagestan served 
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as examples of the other extreme: They wholeheartedly supported Putin's polices and 
welcomed his efforts to rebuild the hierarchy of power in Russia.
However, this was true only for the first months following the publication of the relevant 
Putin directives. With time, Russia's regional leaders began to be braver in their 
expressions of doubts concerning the correctness of Putin's policies. Even such a 
careful politician as the influential president of Tatarstan, Mintimer Shaimiev, today 
publicly questions the logic of creating seven administrative regions.(1) Remarkably, 
Dagestan's leader, Magomedali Magomedov, agreed to join the working group created 
by the Tartar leader to develop an alternative plan for policying the Russian 
administrative system, thereby indirectly supporting Shaimiev against Moscow.(2)
Apparently at this point the leaders of national republics have concluded that the idea of 
administrative super regions would not be long-lived. Moreover, it seems that this idea 
has met resistance from forces that are even more powerful than the regional and 
national leaders. Federal ministers are suspicious of attempts by the president's 
regional representatives to control the flow of finances from the center to the regions 
and refuse to recognize the representatives' role in coordination of the activities of their 
ministries' regional offices. The budget is allocated through the ministries, which by the 
disbursement or nondisbursement of funds can block the projects of the presidential 
representatives, who do not have their own budgets.
This kind of competition for power in Soviet times under Khrushchev's leadership led to 
the collapse of his favorite brainchild Sovnarkhoz -- the prototype of the present-day 
administrative regions. Under Sovnarkhoz territorial units would include three to four 
oblasts, republics or krays, which had very large territories and were poorly governed. 
But the administrative super regions of today are even bigger (they include 12-13 
regions) and are unwieldy. In addition, the Soviet-era party discipline that supported the 
command hierarchy is gone. This alone condemns Putin's administrative system to 
failure.
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The biggest influence on the development of the republics, including Dagestan, is 
exerted by the changes in the allotment of revenue going to federal and regional 
budgets. Earlier, the allocation was almost equal: 51% went to the center and 49% to 
the region. Today the federal share has increased to 63% while the regions' portion has 
dropped to 37%.(3)
The reaction to this change varies among republics. Three categories of republics and 
consequently three types of reactions to Putin's policies can be discerned.
1. In the first category are included the donor republics (those that gave to the federal 
budget more in taxes than they received from it), for example Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan. These republics, possessing a well-developed oil industry, were able to 
increase the quality of life of their population to three to five times higher than in the rest 
of the country. It is understandable that the leaders of these republics are radically 
opposed to the attempts by Moscow to take and redistribute the wealth they have 
created.
2. In the second category are the republics that have created offshore zones on their 
territory (i.e., Ingushetia and Kalmykia). As a result of creating tax breaks for 
businesses registered in these republics, they created a flow of capital from other 
republics. Today, when the largest part of regional revenues is diverted to the federal 
center, the flow of money to offshore zones has dropped significantly. Naturally the 
leaders of Ingushetia and Kalmykia are not happy about this.
3. Representatives of the third category hold absolutely different opinions about the 
redistribution of means. To this category belong dependent regions which rely 
completely on federal subsidies to their budget. This includes most of the republics of 
the North Caucasus, but no one has learned to get as much from such dependency as 
the ruling elite of Dagestan headed by Magomedali Magomedov.
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The leader of Dagestan never raised the question of sovereignty; even in 1991 when 
such declarations were common, he always demonstrated his loyalty to the federal 
center. The price paid by Moscow for this loyalty has been very high. Makhachkala 
became adept at shaking down the federal budget for all kinds of additional finances by 
using as leverage its geopolitical position and proximity to Chechnya. When the second 
military campaign against Chechnya began, President Putin stated many times, 
"Dagestanis have the right to special treatment."(4) To confirm this "special 
relationship," Dagestan received 500 million rubles in 2000 alone.(5) In addition, fate 
itself seems to be helping the republican elite to squeeze more out of Moscow: Even 
periodic fluctuations of the level of the Caspian Sea create the need for multimillion-
ruble expenditures to Dagestan.
However, these multimillion-ruble infusions did not help Dagestan due to the region's 
unprecedented (even by the standards of the North Caucasus) level of official corruption 
and the uncontrolled influence which shady organizations wield in all areas of life. This 
is hardly new. Dagestan was granted multimillion-ruble packages to compensate the 
region for losses incurred during the 1994-96 war in Chechnya. A considerable portion 
of these funds was stolen. According to a report by the Accounting Chamber (Russia's 
counterpart to the US General Accounting Office), the Dagestan government's account 
in Eurobank (Paris) included about $30 million for which local officials could not provide 
adequate explanation.(6) The officials could not explain why the Republic of Dagestan 
had this account or from where the funds had come. It seems likely that the funds came 
from the budget, although the actual details may never be known: An investigation by 
the Accounting Chamber was passed to the procurator, where it has languished. The 
report was presented to Russia's procurator general's office in 1998, but has not 
resulted in an investigation or any administrative punishment. Nor is any investigation 
likely. Once armed groups from Chechnya invaded Dagestan in August 1999, it became 
rude to speak of the budgetary crimes of local elites. Now everything is written off by 
reference to the war or to the hated "Wahhabis."(7)
4
Moscow deliberately closes its eyes to the financial manipulations of the local 
leadership, as long as Dagestan continues to treat the Kremlin as the only guarantor of 
stability and order in the republic. In this way, Putin's reorganization harms the richer 
republics -- by undermining their initiative and enterprising spirit -- and the poorer 
republics -- by freezing them in an almost feudal system of governance and by 
encouraging official corruption.
Moreover, these policies promise to weaken further the already insignificant role of 
municipal authorities, since -- as compensation for loss of power on the federal level -- 
the regional leaders are to receive a free hand in their dealings with the municipalities. 
The situation of local self-government has worsened even more as a result of the 
redistribution of revenue going to federal and regional budgets: Throughout Russia, the 
municipal portion of the local budgets was cut by almost half, from 32% to 17%, 
although expenses did not decrease. As a result of the budget deficits, many cities have 
no money to pay for electricity, gas and coal, and spent months without heat or power 
during the winter of 2000-2001. Municipalities cannot afford to repair buildings. As a 
result, the number of accidents is growing; for instance, an increasing number of gas 
explosions have claimed hundreds, if not thousands, of lives. However, the papers only 
get excited when the blasts are blamed on terrorists.
The Russian government is fooling itself into believing that regions thus controlled will 
be easier to rule because they will become more pliant. In reality, the opposite is true. 
With less money in the regional and municipal budgets, and less responsibility vested in 
their leaders, less can be demanded of them. It should be expected in the near future 
that the residents of the regions increasingly will direct their displeasure toward the 
Kremlin. For the non-Russian peoples, this will translate into a growth of anti-Russian 
sentiment because federal rule, from which all the ills stem, is perceived as Russian 
rule.
The current Chechen war also has contributed to this sentiment. The Kremlin claims 
that, by starting the war, it has prevented the fragmentation of Russia, but the leaders 
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are not correct. If the Russian Federation had accepted Chechnya's independence, this 
would not have brought on the "domino effect" -- that is, the departure of other republics 
from Russia. The destitute and criminal-infested Chechnya did not infect or inspire 
anyone; its relationship with its neighbors before the war worsened every day. Since the 
beginning of the war, however, solidarity with Chechnya has grown on three levels: 1) 
the solidarity of all non-Russian nationalities, including Volga Tatars and Siberian 
Yakuts; 2) Islamic solidarity; and 3) the solidarity of all offended nationalities.
With the beginning of the war, practically all Caucasians, including members of 
nationalities that traditionally do not like the Chechens, started to experience some of 
the same pressures as the Chechens: For the majority of the Russian population, all 
Caucasians have one face -- they are all "dark" and "terrorist." The Chechen war 
demands a separate article; however, one can say that it does constitute the most 
painful and complicated aspect of Russian's nationalities policy.
In the long term the biggest challenge is coping with the changing ethnic composition of 
the population.(8) In almost all of the republics of the North Caucasus, Russians already 
constitute the minority. In the Far East and in Siberia, Russians are only the minority in 
Tuva, but their percentages are shrinking in Buryatia and in Yakutia. According to the 
prognosis, in 10-15 years the number of Chinese in Russian regions of the Far East and 
Siberia will reach about 10 million, and then they will become the ethnic majority in 
Russia's largest geographic region.
However, the main demographic danger for Russians is in the Povolzh region. Today, 
Russians have become the minority in Chuvashia, and are no longer the largest ethnic 
group in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. By 1989, in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan 
Russians constituted less than half of the population but continued to be the largest 
ethnic group in comparison to the other nations. However, there is little doubt that in this 
decade the Tatars are rapidly becoming the largest group in both republics, in which 
case Russians will be regarded as an ethnic minority there.
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The growth of the Tatar population is due not only to a high rate of natural increase (the 
Bashkir's rate of increase is even higher) but also to migration. The majority of the tens 
of thousands of Tatars who arrived in Russia from the other countries of the CIS after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union settled in these republics. Overall, observers note a 
process of "gathering" members of titular nationalities into "their" republics, which 
includes the Tatars.(9) This process reflects not only the absence of opportunities for 
national and cultural development (such as education in the national language) outside 
the territory of the republic but more pressing conditions: In one's own republic one feels 
safer, calmer. This speaks to the general growth of ethnic self-identification and a 
radicalization of inter-ethnic contradictions.
Tartar and Bashkiri nationalists increasingly speak of uniting and creating one Povolzh 
federation.(10) If such a federation were to be formed in the very middle of Russia, it 
could simply split the country into two poorly connected pieces.
The threat of the disintegration of the country could steer policymakers toward two 
radically different political doctrines to form the basis of the Russian government. First, 
is consolidation of a multicultural society. Unfortunately, the idea of a multicultural 
society is absolutely foreign to the powers that be. That is why the government is using 
a different political doctrine and mechanism to consolidate Russian society: 
consolidation accompanied by a growth of Russian nationalism.
The last gubernatorial elections did not leave any doubt that the Kremlin is exploiting 
Russians' nostalgia for the Soviet Union and nationalistic sentiments, and hopes to 
receive support in the regions from former Soviet officials and generals. It is hard to 
imagine that such heroes of the Chechen war as General Viktor Kazantsev, now 
presidential representative in the southern regions, General Konstantin Pulikovsky, 
representative in the Far East regions, and especially General Vladimir Shamanov, the 
ruthless and the most violent general in both Chechen wars, who now serves as 
governor of Ulianovsk oblast, will provide liberal economic policies. Rather, it is quite 
natural to imagine that they will be the most visible carriers of xenophobia, anti-Western 
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sentiment, Soviet militarism and imperialism. Therefore, it is not strange that in Russia 
now xenophobia is growing, suspicion toward the West is growing, and imperialistic 
sentiments are growing. Nationalistic consolidation requires the image of an external 
enemy -- be it "worldwide Islamic terrorism" or "world imperialism."
If nationalism and imperialism become firmly established in Russia they could halt 
temporarily the disintegration process. But then Russian chauvinism will surely stimulate 
the backlash of the national minorities. Of course, strategically, this is a dead-end path 
for democratic development. In my opinion, the mood of Russian nationalism and 
imperialism are not predetermined or irrevocable. The negative tendency has not been 
fully realized; therefore, Russia has time to prevent it. However, the more amicable 
possibilities cannot be achieved by following the present course set by the Putin 
administration, but rather by plotting a new course.
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